Civil Discovery of Social Media Information

With the increasing use of social media, some attorneys have turned their attention to mining the data for litigation purposes.  This appears especially true in employment law cases because of the numbers and the likelihood that both employees and employers will use networking sites for business purposes or to discuss workplace issues. See generally, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?timeline; Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11cv00215 (E.D.Ark. Nov. 2011) (Employee’s Facebook status update protected by First Amendment).   In some of my recent cases (e.g., products liability; contract disputes) I have seen discovery requests that look like this:

“List each email address, social networking site (i.e., Twitter, Facebook, Match.com) and user name that you have used in the past ten years.”

This request raises privacy concerns if only because a ‘user name’ or password is requested.  But, I also think that many people would object to such a request because they also consider their writings (e.g., 'posts' and 'tweets') private despite the label “social”.  I think this is true because many users choose to restrict their communications to a defined list of ‘friends’ or ‘followers’ rather than making their posts available to the general public.  It is this measure of control that most social media sites have preserved that arguably provides a social media user with a reasonable expectation of privacy in their communications.  See United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 534 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (expectation of privacy in electronic repository for personal data is analogous to a personal address book or other repository for such information). Cf. State v. Martin, 106 Wn.App. 850 (2001) (DOL records); Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal.4^th 683 (2007) (court records).  However, whether a court in a given jurisdiction would agree with this perspective in a given case is largely uncertain especially when social media use is perceived to be a relaxation of privacy and when existing law(s) provide little guidance. See e.g., O`Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal.App.4th 1423, 1461, 1464-1466 (2006) (considering whether a blog could constitute a "periodical publication" for purposes of  journalism shield law, even though "digital magazines" did not exist when the statute was enacted.) There are a few recent cases arising from motions to quash subpoenas for production of social media information that provide further insight.

In Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal. 2010), defendants served subpoenas duces tecum on four third-party businesses and social networking websites including Facebook and MySpace.  Crispin filed a motion to quash the subpoenas arguing, among other things, that third-party Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) are prohibited from disclosing electronic communications under the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) 18 U.S.C. Section 2701 (a) (1) and that the requests were otherwise violative of his privacy rights.

The SCA generally prohibits, subject to certain exceptions, a “person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public” from “knowingly divulging to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service.” Id.  The SCA does not include an exception for civil subpoenas. See O’Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal.App. 4^th 1423 (2006); FTC v. Netscape Communications, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 559 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that EC holders may not produce “content” records in response to a civil subpoena and cannot be compelled by court order to do so.)  On the other hand, Google, after sending a form letter objection, has stated that it will produce records showing solely the dates and times of emails sent by account holders if there is no objection within 20 days.

In Crispin, the District Court found that the legislative history of the SCA suggests that Congress wanted to protect electronic communications that are configured to be private, such as…electronic bulletin boards [See Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 875 (9^th Cir. 2002)] and that the plaintiff had standing to attack the subpoenas to Facebook and MySpace because he had a personal right to the information (noting that Facebook posts are accessible only to those whom the user selects and thus are not strictly public.) See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F.Supp. at 980. See also Twitter: New Challenges to Copyright Law in the Internet Age, 10 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 231, 236 (2010) (although tweets are publicly visible by default, senders can restrict messages to their followers).

In sum, the Court in Crispin granted the plaintiff’s motion to quash because applicable law supported arguments that the social media user had a reasonable expectation of privacy by the way he had set his account or had defined the audience with which he communicated.

As the Crispin case demonstrates, however, courts will likely continue to struggle with the intent of statutes designed to regulate electronic communications especially if the laws do not readily accommodate new technology and means of communication.  There is also little doubt that a court could reach a decision different than Crispin on a privacy issue with only a subtle change in facts concerning how the user employed social media.  See e.g., Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 172 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1130 (2009) (MySpace.com post was publicized to an audience whose size supported waiver of any privacy right). See also U.S. Internet Service Providers Assn., Electronic Evidence Compliance -- A Guide For Internet Service Providers, 18 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 945, 965 (2003) (some courts have ultimately managed to skirt privacy objections to a subpoena to an ISP by ordering the subscriber to give consent to the disclosure of the contents of his or her e-mail/electronic data thought to be relevant to a dispute). See also O’Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal.App. 4^th 1423 (2006) (the discovery must be directed to the owner of the data, not the bailee to whom it was entrusted).

In 2012, I expect to see a number of new cases addressing peculiar case facts associated with whether social media user(s) have protected privacy interests in so-called ‘social media’ communications;  whether the form and content is relevant to a dispute and whether the issue of compelled production is properly raised and can be decided by the court as framed by the litigants.

Recovery of Attorney Fees as Damages.

The case law regarding attorney fees awardable as costs of an action is well-developed in Washington. When authorized, the determination of a reasonable attorney fee award is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. See Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 108 Wn.2d 38, 65 (1987). A party is not, therefore, entitled to have such a determination made by a jury. In re Marriage of Firchau, 88 Wn.2d 109, 114-15 (1977).

The case law regarding attorney fees recoverable as damages, however, is significantly less developed or evolved. In the majority of cases which have discussed attorney fee damage recoveries, such recoveries have been based on principles of equitable indemnity:

“[W]hen the natural and proximate consequences of a wrongful act by defendant involve plaintiff in litigation with others, there may, as a general rule, be a recovery of damages for the reasonable expenses incurred in the litigation, including compensation for attorney's fees.”

See Jacob’s Meadow Owners Ass’n v. Plateau 44 II, LLC, 139 Wn.App. 743 (2008) citing Wells v. Aetna Ins. Co., 60 Wn.2d 880, 882 (1962); Manning v. Loidhamer, 13 Wn.App. 766, 769 (1975). See also Tri-M Erectors, Inc. v. Donald M. Drake Co., 27 Wn.App. 529, 531 (1980) (noting that attorney fees incurred in defending suit against third party were recoverable pursuant to contractual indemnity provision as damages, the measure of which was determined by the jury). Pursuant to this rule, such attorney fees are considered to be damages rather than costs.

In several states, the case law is plain that attorney fees are awardable as damages, not only as a matter of equity, but also more generally as a potential form or measure of damages properly awarded upon proof that they were caused or incurred merely as a consequence of negligence. See e.g., Sindell v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, 54 Cal.App.4^th 1457 (1997) citing Prentice v. North American Title Guaranty Corp., 59 Cal.2d 618 (1963). In Washington, however, it appears uncertain whether the recovery of attorney fees as damages must be tied to a recognized equitable exception to the American Rule (where there is no other recognized basis for recovery) such as application of the ABC Rule or whether existing law would support such recovery solely upon a negligence theory of consequential damages.[1] Washington law seems headed in that direction if it is not there already.

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[1] The Washington Supreme Court has explicitly recognized four equitable exceptions to the American Rule in allowing recovery of attorney fees: (1) the common fund theory, Grein v. Cavano, 61 Wn.2d 498, 505 (1963); (2) actions by a third person subjecting a party to litigation, Wells v. Aetna Ins. Co., 60 Wn.2d 880, 882-83 (1962); (3) bad faith or misconduct of a party, Miotke v. City of Spokane, 101 Wn.2d 307, 338 (1984); and (4) dissolving wrongfully issued temporary injunctions or restraining orders, Cecil v. Dominy, 69 Wn.2d 289, 291-94 (1966);Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wn.2d 230, 247 (1981). See generally Philip A. Talmadge, Attorney Fees in Washington, Part. 5 (1995). While the traditional American Rule relates to attorney fees as costs, as noted above, at least two of the recognized equitable exceptions award attorney fees as damages. See, e.g., Cecil, 69 Wn.2d at 291, 418 P.2d 233 (attorney fees as damages in dissolving a wrongfully issued temporary injunction); Wells, 60 Wn.2d at 882 (attorney fees as damages in wrongful action by a third person subjecting a party to litigation). The Washington Supreme Court has also authorized the award of attorney fees as damages in slander of title and wrongful garnishment actions.Rorvig v. Douglas, 123 Wash.2d 854, 873 P.2d 492 (1994) (slander of title action); James v. Cannell, 135 Wn. 80, 82-83 (1925) (wrongful garnishment action), aff'd, 139 Wn. 702 (1926). Consequently, a perhaps more accurate statement of Washington's American Rule is attorney fees are not available as costs or damages absent a contract, statute, or recognized ground in equity. See also Flint v. Hart, 82 Wn.App. 209 (1996); Tradewell Group, Inc. v. Mavis, 71 Wn.App. 120 (1993) regarding application of ABC Rule.

Defense Verdict for Dairy Farm Clients

I recently completed a two week jury trial in Jefferson County Superior Court located in Port Townsend, Washington obtaining a defense verdict for my clients who have owned and operated their dairy farm in nearby Chimacum since the late 1800s. Plaintiffs' attorney glossed over our trial victory when recently reporting a $2.7 million plaintiffs' verdict to the Seattle Times against another defendant, Sprint Company (who I did not represent). So, here is some of the missing part of the story about my clients' case.

Plaintiffs claimed that my clients negligently allowed a horse named 'Vega' to escape from their farm onto a nearby roadway where it was struck and killed by a one-ton utility bucket truck driven by a Sprint telephone installer, defendant John Burnston. The plaintiff, Nanette Aurdal, subsequently ran over the dead horse in her 1994 Ford Explorer allegedly causing her injuries. The jury later found that Mr. Burnston was culpable for causing plaintiff's subsequent accident by leaving the dead horse in the road for a time (while proceeding to a Sprint work station a distance away) without stopping to secure the scene of the accident.

Plaintiffs spent as much energy trying to prove alleged liability of my clients (as they did in their case against Sprint) contending via testimony by their "equine management" expert that the farm's fencing used to contain the horse was 'substandard', inadequate and too flimsy to withstand storm damage which allowed the animal to escape.

Plaintiffs' expert also complained that once Vega escaped, that my clients did not take appropriate and timely action(s) to capture the horse (e.g., that the perimeter fence and driveway exit should have been blocked and that all personnel on the farm should have been summoned and employed to attempt capture). We countered with our own expert on these issues as well as with other witnesses who were at the scene of the escape.

The expert testimony covered many intricacies of horse care including the types of fencing appropriate in various settings to contain horses (e.g., electrified, wire, ribbon and wood fencing) and accepted or 'best' strategies or tactics to employ to catch a horse once it is on the loose (taking into account behavioral/psychological traits common to horses). In the end, the jury found that we successfully rebutted the statutory inference of negligence (once a farm animal enters a roadway in a Restricted Area) finding my clients completely faultless for the plaintiff's accident and her personal injuries/damages.

Job Site Owner Liability for Work-Related Injuries of Independent Contractors and Their Employees.

This post [using the Washington Supreme Court decision in Kamla v. Space Needle Corp., 147 Wn.2d 114 (2002)] reviews some of the primary legal theories upon which a job site owner may become liable for work-related injuries of independent contractors and their employees. In Kamla, the employee of a contractor was hurt while installing a fireworks display near the top of Seattle's Space Needle when a moving elevator caught the employee's safety line and dragged him into the open elevator shaft. The property owner (Space Needle Corp.) prevailed on the issue of liability because of the terms of the parties' contract; the parties' corresponding responsibility for the job site and the parties' relative experience level(s) with the work at issue.

In Washington, the issue of whether a job site owner has liability for work-related injuries of independent contractors and their employees (in various legal contexts) depends on the issue of 'control' and critically whether there is a retention of the right to direct the manner in which the work is performed, not simply whether there is an actual exercise of control over the manner in which the work is performed. An “independent contractor is a person who contracts with another to do something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking.” Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2 (3). On the other hand, employees are “agent[s] employed by [an employer] to perform service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of the service is controlled or is subject to the right to control by the [employer].” Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2 (2). The difference between an independent contractor and an employee is whether the employer can tell the worker how to do his or her job. Employers are not liable for injuries incurred by independent contractors where employers cannot control the manner in which the independent contractor works. Conversely, employers are liable for injuries incurred by employees where the employer retains control over the manner in which the employee works.

Owner's Common Law Duty of Care Based Upon Retained Control.

In Kamla, the Court in determining that the owner had no common law liability as a matter of law was guided by Comment "c" of Section 414 of the Restatement Second of Torts:

[T]he employer must have retained at least some degree of control over the manner in which the word is done. It is not enough that he has merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to employers, but it does not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work, or as to operative detail. There must be such a retention of a right of supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his own way.
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 414, comment "c" (1965).

Following the logic of Section 414, comment "c", the Court reasoned that the critical inquiry was whether the owner retained the right to direct the manner in which the work was completed by the contractor and held (under the facts of the case) that the owner did not have a common law duty of care based upon alleged 'retained control' stating that: "Space Needle did not retain the right to interfere with the manner in which Pyro completed its work, nor did Space Needle affirmatively assume responsibility for workers' safety. Space Needle simply agreed to provide Pyro a suitable display site and fallout zone, access to the display site to set up the display, adequate crowd control, firefighters, and permit fees." Kamla, 147 Wn.2d at 122.

Owner's Potential Statutory Duty of Care Under WISHA.

Next, the Court in Kamla considered whether the owner had any statutory duty of care under WISHA ('Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act'), RCW Chapter 49.17. The Court determined that an owner is not per se liable under the requirements of RCW 49.17.060 (Employer--General safety standard--Compliance) and that jobsite owners do not play a role sufficiently analogous to general contractors to justify imposing upon them the same nondelegable duty to ensure WISHA compliance when there is no general contractor.

Citing Stute v. P.B.M.C., Inc., 114 Wn.2d 454 (1990), the Court recognized that because a general contractor is in the best position, financially and structurally, to ensure WISHA compliance or provide safety equipment to workers “the prime responsibility for safety of all workers ... is on the general contractor.” Id. at 463. The Court reasoned that the same was not necessarily true of job-site owners noting that although owners may have a similar degree of authority to control jobsite work conditions, they do not necessarily have a similar degree of knowledge or expertise about WISHA compliant work conditions. Jobsite owners can run the gamut from an owner/developer with the same degree of knowledge about WISHA compliant work conditions as that of a general contractor to a public corporation without any knowledge about WISHA regulations governing a specific trade. Because jobsite owners may not have knowledge about the manner in which a job should be performed or about WISHA compliant work conditions, it is unrealistic to conclude all jobsite owners necessarily control work conditions. Instead, some jobsite owners may reasonably rely on the contractors they hire to ensure WISHA compliance because those jobsite owners cannot practically instruct contractors on how to complete the work safely and properly. Consequently, in Kamla, the Court held that if a jobsite owner does not retain control over the manner in which an independent contractor completes its work, the jobsite owner does not have a duty under WISHA to “comply with the rules, regulations, and orders promulgated under [chapter 49.17 RCW].” RCW 49.17.060(2).

Owner's Potential Common Law Duty As Landowner.

Finally, the Court in Kamla considered the contractor's arguments that the owner (Space Needle) has a common law duty as landowner to its invitees. In this regard the Court noted that it had adopted sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement Second of Torts to define a landowner's duty to invitees:

A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he

(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and

(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and

(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.

Restatement Second of Torts § 343. See also Iwai v. State, 129 Wn.2d 84 (1996) (The “legal duty owed by a landowner to a person entering the premises depends on whether the entrant [is] a trespasser, licensee, or invitee.”).

In Kamla, Space Needle argued that because the danger at issue (an open/moving elevator) was known and obvious, that it could not be liable for Kamla's injury. But, the Court found that this argument ignored section 343A of the Restatement which provided that:

“A possessor of land is not liable to his [or her] invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.”

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A.

Consequently, the Kamla Court stated that properly framed, the question of any common law duty as a property owner turned upon whether Space Needle should have anticipated Kamla's harm, despite an obvious hazard posed by the moving elevator(s). Under the facts, the Court held that Space Needle was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue noting that the contractor Pyro was a business entity that represented itself as possessing expertise in the creation and execution of fireworks displays. Collectively, the project team for Pyro had over 100 years of experience in designing, installing, and executing fireworks displays. Pyro created similar displays at the Space Needle the two previous years and suggested to Space Needle that it incorporate the 200-foot level into the 1997 New Year's Eve display. Kamla worked for Pyro in the core of the Space Needle the two previous years. Pyro employees who worked in the core were exposed to and aware of the danger posed by the moving elevators. Finally, Pyro employees had independently devised a safety system designed to avoid the elevator openings. Given Pyro's expertise, The Court concluded given Kamla's two years of personal experience working on the 200-foot level next to the obvious danger posed by the elevators and his own acute awareness of the danger posed by the moving elevators, that no reasonable trier of fact could find Space Needle should have anticipated that Kamla would drag his safety line across the open elevator shaft.

The Kamla case provides a good starting point when analyzing any issue of potential liability of an owner for injuries sustained by employee(s) of an independent contractor. The case also highlights the importance of contractual negotiations and terms which may dictate the measure of control that an owner retains over the work performed by a contractor.

The Impact Of Evidence Extrinsic To The Complaint In Determining An Insurer's Duty To Defend.

Under Washington law, there are two exceptions to the rule that the duty to defend must be determined only from the complaint, and both the exceptions favor the insured. If coverage is not clear from the face of the complaint but may exist, the insurer must investigate the claim and give the insured the benefit of the doubt in determining whether the insurer has an obligation to defend. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 17 Wn.App. 331, 334 (1977). Similarly, facts outside the complaint may be considered if “ ‘(a) the allegations are in conflict with facts known to or readily ascertainable by the insurer or (b) the allegations of the complaint are ambiguous or inadequate.’ ” Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roffe, Inc., 73 Wn.App. 858, 862 (1994) (quoting E-Z Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 106 Wn.2d 901, 908 (1986). An insurer has an obligation to give the rights of the insured the same consideration that it gives to its own monetary interests. See Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 105 Wn.2d 381, 388 (1986). Put simply, an insurer may not rely on facts extrinsic to the complaint in order to deny its duty to defend where the complaint can be interpreted as triggering the duty to defend. If in doubt, the insurer may file a declaratory action. See Truck Ins. Exchange v. Vanport Homes, Inc., 147 Wn.2d 751, 761 (2002).

Discovery Of Expert Information Over A Civil Rule 26 (b)(5)(B) Objection.

There seems to be expert(s) everywhere who are willing to investigate, document and analyze almost any subject matter on short notice and later testify about their efforts, if only given the chance. Sometimes a party or parties to litigation may attempt to protect discovery of what expert(s) find at the scene of a loss even though the expert(s) were among the first to arrive and were able to collect important evidence before it dissipated. For example, it is not uncommon for a property owner to call their insurer upon discovery of a loss caused by landslide, fire, flood or earthquake (or some other event) and, in turn, the insurer dispatches an expert (or communicates with one already on site) to try and quickly discern and document the cause of the loss, as well as to determine whether any ongoing damages can be mitigated. However, sometimes the party who tasked the expert, near the inception or shortly after the occurrence of loss, does not want to employ the expert for purposes of litigation for tactical reasons. In Washington, Civil Rule 26 (b)(5)(B) may be used by a party to try and protect such expert information from discovery providing in pertinent part:

(5) Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subsection (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows:

(A) (i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion, and to state such other information about the expert as may be discoverable under these rules. (ii) A party may, subject to the provisions of this rule and of rules 30 and 31, depose each person whom any other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial.

(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.

CR 26 (b)(5)(B) (emphasis added).

I have been involved in many case(s) in which an expert (e.g., a geologist; a fire investigator, etc.) may have the best and perhaps only information of what actually happened but my opponent has attempted to conceal or exclude it claiming the information was gathered by a consulting expert for the purposes of or in anticipation of litigation and that he or she has no intention of calling the expert to testify at trial. A typical response to such an objection is that the information sought could not and cannot be obtained on the critical issue of causation by any other means (i.e., a substantial need exists and "exceptional circumstances" are present). See CR 26 (b)(5)(B). For example, the party seeking the expert discovery over objection may argue that the expert is the kind of exceptional witness discussed in Tope v. King County, 189 Wn. 463 (1937); an expert who was able to observe the “premises at the time that the damage was wrought” and hence his testimony is more salient and objective by the very nature of the timing and the trained skill of his factual observations. The determination of whether the party seeking discovery has shown exceptional circumstances (i.e., that it is impracticable or impossible to obtain the information by other means) is vested in the sound discretion of the trial judge, who should look at the facts and circumstances of each case in arriving at an ultimate conclusion. See Heidebrink v. Moriwaki, 104 Wn.2d 392 (1985). See also, Henry Enterprises, Inc. v. Smith, 225 Kan. 615, 592 P.2d 915 (1979); Roggelin v. Auto-Owners Ins., 2002 Ohio 7310 (Ohio App. 2002).

Another argument for compelling the discovery of the expert information over a Civil Rule 26 objection is that the information was not obtained or developed for or in anticipation of litigation but rather that the expert was dispatched for some other purpose and in a different context. In determining whether a particular document was prepared in "anticipation of litigation" within the meaning of Civil Rule 26 a court should consider the expectations of the specific parties involved in light of the rationale or general policy of the rules to allow broad discovery while maintaining certain restraints on bad faith, irrelevant, and privileged inquiries. Id. See generally, Johnson v. McCay, 77 Wn.App. 603, 609 (1995) In Re: Firestorm 1991, 129 Wn.2d 130 (1996); Escalante v. Sentry Ins., 49 Wn.App. 375 (1987). The party seeking disclosure of expert or work-product information over objection may also argue waiver where all or part of the discovery sought has previously been voluntarily disclosed. See Limstrom v. Ladenburg, 110 Wn. App. 133, 145, 39 P.3d 351 (2002).

Disputes over the discovery and/or use of expert information are usually very contentious because their outcome may also determine the outcome of the entire lawsuit. The facts concerning how the expert was originally employed, for what purpose and whether the information should be shared also usually present difficult issues and balancing tests (e.g., broad discovery/fairness versus individual party rights) for the court to decide.

Law Tech: JD Supra

The JD Supra website is a good place to find articles about specific legal topics, legal briefing and pleadings, and case law, as well as to learn a bit more about a lawyer's practice. A registered user of the site can upload documents by category or type and posted documents are searchable and can be found on the Web; creating a repository of legal documents with an internet cast. According to the website owners:

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A single user or firm can post documents and create a profile for free but they can also pay a registration fee to be able to post contact information and to employ the site for more powerful marketing purposes. A "widget" for JD Supra can be found on the lower sidebar of this site.